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Problem area 
Aviation security concerns 
measures taken to counter acts of 
unlawful interference against civil 
aviation. Since the events of 11 
September and also the London 
Mega Terror Plot in August 2006, 
the aviation community has 
strengthened security. A set of 
urgency measures were taken by 
authorities (e.g. Eurocontrol, ICAO, 
European Commission, ECAC, 
FAA/TSA) to increase security, 
both in airports and on-board 
aircraft. Analysis of the security 
measures demonstrated that little 
was done on-board (the focus was 
on cockpit door reinforcement, 
training of cabin crew, and sky 
marshals on board more flights). 
Hence, there might be a need to 
further increase on-board security. 
 
Description of work 
SAFEE aims to develop advanced 
aircraft security systems designed to 
prevent and respond adequately to 
in-flight threats. The main goal is to 
ensure a fully secured flight from 
departure to arrival destination. This 
is done through implementation of 
on-board threat detection systems 
and the provision of reliable threat 
information to the flight crew.  
In this paper, we introduce SAFEE 
focusing on the SAFEE users 
(pilots, cabin crew, sky marshals) 
and their systems and technologies. 
Results and conclusions 
The SAFEE project has defined a 
set of potential targets for attacks, 
and identified detection tools and 
response actions to be developed 
and assessed. Depending on the 
threat level, different security 
procedures for the flight crew will 
apply. The SAFEE Operational 
Concept anticipates new interfaces 
for the pilot, cabin crew and 
security staff, on-board crew 
communication links, and air/ 
ground communication links (with 
the European Regional Renegade 
Information Dissemination System. 
The SAFEE functionalities include: 
• On-board threat detection 
• Threat assessment and response 
management systems 
• Emergency avoidance systems 
• Flight reconfiguration 
• Anti threat data links 
• Secured voice and data 
communications. 
• Secured open world (internet). 
• Authentication of pilot/crew 
commands on-board aircraft. 
 
Applicability 
The SAFEE operational concept 
and systems are now validated with 
the NLR GRACE flight simulator. 
Results and recommendations are 
disseminated through the SAFEE 
Users Club, in which key aviation 
security representatives and air 
transport stakeholders participate. 
This report is based on a presentation held at the 4th International Aviation Security Technology Symposium, Washington (U.S.A.), 
November 27 – December 1, 2006. 
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Summary 
Since the events of September 11th (and, to some extent, also after the London Mega Terror Plot 
in August 2006), the aviation community has strengthened security, so as to counteract threats 
to air transport. However, analysis of the new security measures demonstrated that little was 
done on-board (the main focus was on cockpit door reinforcement, better training of cabin crew, 
and sky marshals on board more flights). Hence, there might still be a need to further increase 
on-board security. It is clear that a fresh approach needs to be adopted; an approach which will 
utilize new technologies in order to achieve the goal: create a safe, none burdening to the 
customer and economical security system which restores confidence of air passengers.  
 
Therefore, this paper introduces the SAFEE aircraft systems. SAFEE aims to ensure a fully 
secured flight from departure to arrival destination. The SAFEE approach is to proactively 
anticipate in-flight threats and to focus the system development on countering threats with the 
highest risk. For this purpose, security occurrences have been analyzed and a risk and threat 
assessment has been performed [5]. Based on the findings, the developers of SAFEE have 
defined 11 basic threat scenarios which the system must counter. The countermeasures are 
based on subsystems that will identify threats in real time, recommend on (and execute) 
appropriate responses and increase survivability of the flight. The basic principles for the 
SAFEE operational concept and system architecture are now described. The SAFEE project has 
defined a set of potential targets for attacks, and identified detection tools and response actions 
to be developed and assessed. Depending on the threat level, different security procedures for 
on-board actors will apply. The SAFEE Operational Concept is in line with this, and anticipates 
security support for pilots, cabin crew, and security staff. The SAFEE system has interfaces for 
the pilot (in the cockpit), cabin crew and security staff (in the cabin), on-board crew 
communication links, and air/ground communication links. It is also possible that on-ground 
security staff may obtain real-time access individual sensor output or on-board threat level 
information through a data-link connection (ACARS or VDL). A foreseen air/ground data-link 
with the European Regional Renegade Information Dissemination System (ERRIDS) will be the 
main (secured) channel/gateway for uplink and downlink of threat information from the ground 
to the aircraft and vice versa. The SAFEE operational concept and systems are now being 
validated with the NLR GRACE flight simulator, which is also used for security training. 
 
One should realize that, as terrorists are constantly developing new and improved abilities and 
Modes of Hostile Action, in addition to analyzing and utilizing aviation security data, it is 
important to include the use of intelligence-based information and/or opinion gathered from 
security experts. 
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List of acronyms 
ACARS  Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System 
ACRF   Access Control and Registration 
AOC   Airline Operations Centre 
ATC   Air Traffic Control 
ATDL   Anti Threat Data Link 
ATM   Air Traffic Management 
DB   Data Base 
DODF   Dangerous Objects Detection Function 
EADS   European Aeronautics Defence and Space company 
EAS   Emergency Avoidance System 
ECAC   European Civil Aviation Conference 
ERRIDS  European Regional Renegade Information Dissemination System 
ETDS   Electromagnetic Threat Detection System 
EUROCONTROL European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation 
FAA   Federal Aviation Administration 
FRF   Flight Reconfiguration Function 
GRACE  Generic Research Aircraft Cockpit Environment 
ICAO   International Civil Aviation Organisation 
JAR   Joint Aviation Requirements 
NLR   Netherlands National Aerospace Laboratory 
OPS   Operations 
OTDS   On-board Threat Detection System 
PMHA   Possible Modes of Hostile Action 
PSA   Prohibited Security Area 
RAP   Risk Assessment Process 
SAFEE   Security of Aircraft in the Future European Environment (EU project) 
SBDF   Suspicious Behaviour Detection Function 
SME   Small or Medium sized Enterprise 
TARMS  Threat Assessment and Response Management System 
TSA   Transportation Security Administration 
VDL   VHF Data Link 
VHF   Very High Frequency 
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1 Introduction 
Aviation security concerns measures taken to counter acts of unlawful interference against civil 
aviation. Since the events of September 11th (and, to some extent, also after the London Mega 
Terror Plot in August 2006), the aviation community has strengthened security, so as to 
counteract threats to air transport. The immediate drop in passengers following September 11th 
showed that public confidence in air transport was severely eroded for a significant period of 
time. A first set of urgency measures were taken by authorities (e.g. EUROCONTROL, ICAO, 
European Commission, ECAC, FAA/TSA) to increase security, both in airports and on-board 
aircraft. In aviation, where responsibilities and tasks are divided between several actors, 
implementing new security systems and procedures in a safe and secure way is not always easy, 
and depends strongly on adequate response and communication procedures.  
 
Analysis of the new security measures demonstrated that little was done on-board (the main 
focus was on cockpit door reinforcement, better training of cabin crew, and sky marshals on 
board more flights). Hence, there might be a need to further increase on-board security. It is 
clear that a fresh approach needs to be adopted; an approach which will utilize new technologies 
in order to achieve the goal: create a safe, none burdening to the customer and economical 
security system which restores confidence of air passengers.  
 
SAFEE aims to develop advanced aircraft security systems designed to prevent and respond 
adequately to in-flight threats. The main goal is to ensure a fully secured flight from departure 
to arrival destination. This is done through implementation of on-board threat detection systems 
and the provision of reliable threat information to the flight crew. In the decision making and 
response management process, air/ground exchange of threat level information (e.g. down-
linking of aircraft voice/video information) is foreseen. In this process, SAFEE anticipates the 
use of the European Regional Renegade Information Dissemination System (ERRIDS), which is 
being developed under co-ordination of EUROCONTROL.  
 
In this paper, we introduce the SAFEE project and its sub systems. The next Section presents 
some background. This is followed by an outline of the SAFEE approach and the Description of 
Work, focusing on the SAFEE users (pilots, cabin crew and sky marshals) and the SAFEE 
systems and technologies.  
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2 Background 
Aviation security procedures are well founded in international and national regulations, laws 
and procedures since at least the early 70s. However, the ‘9/11’ hijackings have shown that it is 
not always possible to prevent the occurrence of extremely severe events. This has led to 
adaptations of the aviation security standards, recommended practices and regulations, and has 
increased security research and development. The two main European aviation security research 
programs are SAFEE [1, 2, 4] and ERRIDS [3]. Whereas SAFEE focuses on the construction of 
an aircraft decision support system, the EUROCONTROL driven ERRIDS (European Regional 
Renegade Information Dissemination System) focuses on exchange of threat and incident 
information between ground organizations involved in handling renegades. The main goal of 
these systems is to ensure a fully secure flight from departure to arrival destination whatever the 
identified threats are.  
 
The proponents of the SAFEE project are major European industrial actors of the Aeronautical 
sector associated with high level research centers, several relevant Small Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) and some specialized universities. Among the 31 partners are the co-ordinator Sagem 
Defense Sécurité, Airbus, Thales Avionics (France); Siemens, EADS (Germany); BAE 
Systems, University of Reading (UK); National Aerospace Laboratory NLR, Ecorys, SITA (the 
Netherlands); Athena GS3 (Israel); Galileo Avionica, Selex, Teleavio (Italy); to name a few.  
 
The project characteristics are:  
Title:  Security of Aircraft in the Future European Environment  
Acronym:  SAFEE  
Customer:  European Commission  
Scientific Officer:  Mr. Marco Brusati  
Contract No.:  AIP3-CT-2003-503521  
Total Cost:  36 M€  
EC Contribution:  19 M€  
Starting Date:  01/02/2004  
Duration:  48 months  
Web-site:  http://www.safee.reading.ac.uk  
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3 Description of Work 
SAFEE project main purpose is to develop systems that will be able to address an on-board 
situation in the case that all preceding measures have failed. The SAFEE objective is to 
strengthen the last line of defense. The SAFEE approach is that waiting for new types of threats 
and incidents to occur and then improve security is not the right way forward. The aim shall be 
to proactively anticipate threats and to focus the system development on countering those 
threats with the highest risk. In order to identify threats, and the risks resulting from those 
threats, SAFEE has developed and applied a tailor made, security oriented, Risk Assessment 
methodology and Process (RAP), and then designed an operational concept and system 
requirements following challenges derived from this outcome of the risk assessment.  
 
The project baseline is past experience, which has demonstrated that hostile persons may go 
through the different airport controls and security measures, access an aircraft, and even initiate 
hostile actions. There is therefore a need to secure the aircraft itself as the last barrier to attacks. 
The project is focused on the implementation of onboard threat detection systems and the 
provision of reliable threat information to the flight crew. In the decision making and response 
management process, secured air/ground exchange of threat level information is foreseen. In 
Figure 1 the ATM security environment and the main threats to it are depicted. On-board threats 
include hijacking, sabotage of the aircraft systems, bringing explosives on-board, use of 
biological and chemical agents, hampering of the flight controls. Not all these threats are easily 
detected with the current state of security systems. As long as certain threats can't be detected by 
the ground security and certainly not on board, there is a high potentiality of a successful attack. 
In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, several technologies have been developed 
and new procedures have been implemented to improve the security in air transport.  
 
Potential danger can be found in several areas of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) 
environment. SAFEE does not address all identified areas where improvement may be 
implemented; the project aims to strengthen the last line of defence by implementing technology 
to deal with on-board security issues. Within SAFEE only a number of topics are handled. The 
SAFEE project has defined a set of potential targets for attacks, and identified detection tools 
and response actions to be developed and assessed. The JAR-OPS security requirements for 
commercial air transportation (Ref. 6, Subpart S - Security) prescribe that the cabin crew 
notifies the flight crew in case of suspicious activity or security breaches in the cabin. SAFEE is 
in line with this, as it aims to develop new on-board security systems to support the commander, 
who -at present - has the end-authority for dealing with threats on-board the aircraft (up to and 
including emergency declaration). However, note that SAFEE also investigates the situation 
where the cabin crew has some authority to deal with threats (low-level only) in the cabin. 
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Figure 1 Overview of SAFEE Security Scope 
 
The SAFEE Operational Concept anticipates security support for: 
 Pilots – will have a modified cockpit and new equipment available for use when a threat 
occurs. After an attack emergency procedures will be applied.  
 Cabin Crew – might be the first to detect acts of unlawful interference. Trained cabin crew, 
supported by passenger and cargo information, might be able to prevent escalation of low 
level threats into more severe incidents.  
 Sky marshal – is well trained to respond to severe on-board threats, and to decide (together 
with the pilots) how to react in the first minutes of an attack. SAFEE also considers the 
possibility that there is no sky marshal on board.  
 
The following functionalities are foreseen:  
 On-board Threat Detection System (OTDS), with three functionalities:  
o Dangerous Objects Detection Function (DODF),  
o Suspicious Behavior Detection Function (SBDF),  
o Access Control and Registration (ACRF).  
 Threat Assessment and Response Management System (TARMS).  
 Emergency Avoidance System (EAS).  
 Flight Reconfiguration Function (FRF).  
 Anti Threat Data Link (ATDL).  
 Electromagnetic Threat Detection System (ETDS).  
 Secured voice & data communications.  
 Secured open world (internet on-board).  
 Authentication of pilot/crew commands.  
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The SAFEE systems output comprises:  
 Alert / information to the cockpit crew;  
 Alert / information to the cabin crew;  
 Alert / information to security staff;  
 Commands to the aircraft systems;  
 Information to ground when necessary.  
 
SAFEE systems input includes:  
 Pre-flight data: passenger data, luggage data, cargo data, threat level data.  
 Pre-flight Terrain, Obstacles, Prohibited for Security Areas (PSA) data.  
 In-flight data: OTDS alerts, crew input, aircraft systems input (e.g. position), sensor data, 
updates of pre-flight data.  
 Input from ground network systems (ERRIDS).  
 Potential collision alerts (from EAS).  
 
The SAFEE system has interfaces for the pilot (in the cockpit), cabin crew and security staff (in 
the cabin), on-board crew communication links, and air/ground communication links.It is also 
possible that on-ground security staff may obtain real-time access individual sensor output 
through a data-link connection (ACARS or VDL). The foreseen air/ground data-link with the 
ERRIDS will be the main (secured) channel/gateway for uplink and downlink of threat 
information from the ground to the aircraft and vice versa. Information on the status of control 
of the aircraft and its predicted flight path is essential to the national authorities and other 
decision makers. The key subsystems are introduced in the following.  
 
On Board Threat Detection (OTDS)  
The aim of the development of an On-board Threat Detection System (OTDS) is to provide 
means for automatically detecting upcoming threats on board of an aircraft and for alerting the 
cabin crew and other on-board systems in case of a detected threat. The OTDS goal is to 
identify a large scale of threat scenarios including threats emerging from different origins such 
as individuals or certain goods and materials. For the reliable detection of threats at an 
acceptable rate of false alert, information gained from multiple sensors needs to be evaluated 
and correlated. Among those sensors are video cameras and microphones (for face recognition, 
evaluation of voice or speech characteristics, and analysis of gait peculiarities, extraordinary 
motion patterns and gestures), chemical ‘sniffers’ and detection systems (for detecting weapons, 
explosives, chemical agents).  
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Threat Assessment and Response Management System (TARMS)  
One of SAFEE's most innovative sub systems is the operational Threat Assessment and 
Response Management System (TARMS). The TARMS is assessing the overall threat level to 
the aircraft at any given time, by processing a large amounts of information, gathered from 
different sources / actors, such as the threat information obtained from on-board sensors, off-
board intelligence, passenger background files, behaviour models and the expected threat 
scenarios. TARMS, therefore is comparing observations with expectation models, and then 
finally recommend the appropriate response action. TARMS will use this information to 
generate a prioritised menu of courses of action for actors that are feasible, safe and conform to 
relevant governmental policy. The decision support tool is able to analyze evident as well as 
hidden relationships between different input variables, work with uncertain inputs and make 
useful inferences in the presence of this uncertainty and missing information. The use of a 
probabilistic framework and probabilistic graph models (such as Bayesian networks) allow 
disparate sources of information to be fused. TARMS engineering takes into consideration 
different end users, depending on the level of the threat (cabin crew, air marshals, pilots, ground 
security, ATC) and links together all the actors, for the first time.  
 
Flight Survivability 
The SAFEE Flight Survivability sub systems are activated in the event that the pilot is 
incapacitated by a terrorist action, or perpetrators have gained access to the flight controls, and 
aim to prevent ‘9/11’ like scenarios where the aircraft itself is used as a weapon. SAFEE 
Emergency Avoidance System (EAS) ultimately foresees automatically take control of the 
aircraft and the generation of a manoeuvre to avoid ground or manmade structure collision. In 
the case of a crisis situation, the EAS is a temporary measure, as it does not propose a definitive 
solution to the situation. Automatic return to an airfield with all the pilot controls disabled is the 
final complement to EAS. SAFEE is also assuming that flight plan, suitable for a normal "no 
threat situation" might not be suitable when the flight risk exceeds a certain thresh hold. 
Therefore, EAS is connected to a so-called Prohibited Security Areas Database (PSA DB). The 
PSA DB is flight area information (terrain elevation data, obstacles data, and PSA data) in a 
hierarchical manner, based on unique risk assessment process (SAFEE RAP), developed within 
the SAFEE framework. When a threat is detected and processed on board and the EAS is 
engaged, an authorized flight area (in a non threat flight condition) can become prohibited. The 
area to be avoided can be a a society symbol (government institute, cultural symbol), a high risk 
facility (such as a nuclear power plant or a chemical industrial facility), a major sport event (the 
Olympic Stadium, the Superbowl), et cetera. The prohibited areas need to be established by the 
appropriate authorities, in a national and international level field.  
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Secure Communications and Data Protection  
Some attempts to take over the control of an aircraft by false Air Traffic Control messages have 
been already detected, and the taking over of remote computers by hackers has been achieved 
successfully on many occasions. Securing data transfer outside the aircraft and inside the 
aircraft is therefore a major issue and SAFFE provide communication services that meet both 
safety and security requirements and increasing communications’ throughput. The 
communication between the “open world” and the avionics of the aircraft makes it potentially 
very sensitive to a cyber attack by a hacker located in the aircraft or on ground. SAFEE 
therefore is taking advantage of the most recent progress on data encryption and of firewalls, 
allowing attacks detection, to report and to restore initial critical data when necessary.  
 
Risk Assessment to further Improve In-Flight Security  
The SAFEE approach is to proactively anticipate in-flight threats and to focus the system 
development on countering the threats with the highest risk. For this purpose, security 
occurrences have been analyzed and a risk and threat assessment has been performed [5]. 
Historically, system and concept developers avoided explicit modeling of security risks. Over 
the years, risk assessments were focused on accident risks, natural hazard risks, business 
interruption risks, project risks, and financial risks. However, the area of security risk did not 
receive its well deserved attention and it should be noted that there exists a clear distinction 
between security oriented risk assessments and safety oriented methodologies for risk 
assessment due to the different nature of the risk element. Safety related incidents/accidents are 
un-intentional occurrences, while security related occurrences often are intentional acts of 
unlawful interference where perpetrators are constantly seeking to exploit the vulnerabilities of 
the air transportation system to perform a certain threat scenario. In security related risk 
assessment, the vulnerability element is therefore to be included via a metric of the likelihood 
that various types of safeguarding against a scenario will fail. The aim is to identify potential 
threats, to determine timely means to safeguard against these threats, and to prioritize them 
according to a risk level. In SAFEE, we have introduced a new security oriented risk assessment 
process, which might be used by decision makers to decide on the safe and secure introduction 
of new security systems/concepts : the SAFEE Risk Assessment Process (RAP) [5]. A wide 
range of aviation security incidents and accidents (from the NLR Air Transport Security 
database, official ICAO reporting systems, insurance claims, regulator data, airline reporting 
systems, and research centers) was analyzed in the process, including terror/criminal acts – e.g. 
explosions, hijacks, and sabotage either in flight or at the airport, unruly passenger behavior and 
Security breaches – the use of forbidden items in the cabin. The aviation security databases have 
been used to identify and analyze threats related to current practice flight operations. The 
outcome of the risk assessment has been used to focus the operational concept and supporting 
SAFEE technologies on the most relevant in-flight threats. 
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4 Conclusions and recommendations 
Since the events of September 11th (and, to some extent, also after the London Mega Terror Plot 
in August 2006), the aviation community has strengthened security, so as to counteract threats 
to air transport. However, analysis of the new security measures demonstrated that little was 
done on-board (the main focus was on cockpit door reinforcement, better training of cabin crew, 
and sky marshals on board more flights). Hence, there might still be a need to further increase 
on-board security. It is clear that a fresh approach needs to be adopted; an approach which will 
utilize new technologies in order to achieve the goal: create a safe, none burdening to the 
customer and economical security system which restores confidence of air passengers.  
 
Therefore, this paper has introduced the SAFEE aircraft systems. SAFEE aims to ensure a fully 
secured flight from departure to arrival destination. The SAFEE approach is to proactively 
anticipate in-flight threats and to focus the system development on countering threats with the 
highest risk. For this purpose, security occurrences have been analyzed and a risk and threat 
assessment has been performed [5]. Based on the findings, the developers of SAFEE have 
defined 11 basic threat scenarios which the system must counter. The counter-measures are 
based on subsystems that will identify threats in real time, recommend on (and execute) 
appropriate responses and increase survivability of the flight. The basic principles for the 
SAFEE operational concept and system architecture have been described. The SAFEE project 
has defined a set of potential targets for attacks, and identified detection tools and response 
actions to be developed and assessed. Depending on the threat level, different security 
procedures for on-board actors will apply. The SAFEE Operational Concept is in line with this, 
and anticipates security support for pilots, cabin crew, and security staff. The SAFEE system 
has interfaces for the pilot (in the cockpit), cabin crew and security staff (in the cabin), on-board 
crew communication links, and air/ground communication links. It is also possible that on-
ground security staff may obtain real-time access individual sensor output or on-board threat 
level information through a data-link connection (ACARS or VDL). A foreseen air/ground data-
link with the European Regional Renegade Information Dissemination System (ERRIDS) will 
be the main (secured) channel/gateway for uplink and downlink of threat information from the 
ground to the aircraft and vice versa. The SAFEE operational concept and systems are now 
being validated with the NLR GRACE flight simulator, which is also used for security training. 
 
One should realize that, as terrorists are constantly developing new and improved abilities and 
Modes of Hostile Action, in addition to analyzing and utilizing aviation security data, it is 
important to include the use of intelligence-based information and/or opinion gathered from 
security experts.  
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